Hospital Caserta

Sheet by: Isabella Insolvibile

General data

Town: Caserta

Province: Napoli (Caserta)

Region: Campania

Location/Address: via Torrino 1 - Caserta

Type of camp: Military hospital

Intended to: Officers; NCOs; Troops

Accommodation: military quarters

Operating: from 05/1941 to 08/1943

Commanding Officer: Col. Giuseppe D’Ambrosio (? -?)

Brief chronology:
March 1941: a section of the hospital was assigned to Allied PoWs.
18 August 1942: Lt. Reeves, who had escaped from PG 66 Capua and was wounded, died.
29 September 1942: Private Jilani was killed.
October 1942: Major. Stuppell escaped.
November 1942: Rifleman Davies, who had escaped from PG 66 Capua and was wounded, died.
March 1943: the hospital was assigned to Italians. The majority of Prisoners were transferred elsewhere.

Allied prisoners in the Caserta camp

Data Generals Officers NCOs Troops TOT
01/03/1942 26 40 225 291
01/04/1942 18 15 97 130
01/05/1942 21 14 87 122
01/06/1943 18 16 90 124
01/07/1942 46 76 523 645
01/08/1943 67 59 393 519
30/09/1942 74 80 659 813
31/10/1942 68 78 607 753
30/11/1942 49 119 926 1094
31/12/1942 57 117 882 1056[1]
31/01/1943 65 63 490 618[2]
28/02/1943 16 26 224 266[3]
31/03/1943 8 12 114 134[4]
30/04/1943 8 9 95 112[5]
31/05/1943 9 9 59 77[6]
30/06/1943 6 6 69 81[7]
31/08/1943 13 13 152 178[8]
  [1] Including 11 American privates. [2] Including 3 American officers, 2 NCOs, and 16 privates. [3] Including 5 American officers, 5 NCOs, and 24 privates. [4] Including 2 American officers, 4 NCOs, and 11 privates. [5] Including 1 American officer and 5 privates. [6] Including 1 American officer, 1 NCO, and 3 privates. [7] Including 3 American officers, 3 NCOs, and 5 privates. [8] Including 8 American officers, 9 NCOs, and 54 privates.

Camp’s overview

Located in a building built in the mid-nineteenth century, Caserta military hospital was, for a long time, the largest PoW hospital in Italy. It also treated Italian soldiers and, in separate sectors, civilians. The hospital also treated wounded PoWs transferred from the camps in North Africa. Some of them, in critical conditions (defined as “unmovable” in the Geneva conventions), ended up dying in Caserta because of their wounds or the horrendous living conditions of the African camps. The International Red Cross Committee representative wrote, in November 1942, that:

On the day of our visit several hundred fresh prisoners arrived, coming direct from North Africa. We saw 30 who were suffering from serious attacks of dysentery. Very emaciated in a state of complete starvation from ascites and ulcers, their morale broken, they burst into tears the moment they were spoken to. The new arrivals (even those who were not suffering from dysentery) were also in a lamentable condition. The mortality among them is from 3 to 4 per cent, and even more. [TNA, WO 361/1931]


In a letter reserved to the IRCC president, things were spelt out even more directly:

[…] tous avec des signes plus ou moins prononcés d’inanition. On m’a montré une trentine d’entre eux. Ils étaient couchés tout nus sous une couverture de laine sur leurs lits. (On leur avait enlevé leurs habits pour nettoyage et désinfection et on ne leur avait pas encore donné les vêtements d’hôpital). C’étaient des squelettes avec œdèmes et ascites, et les draps salis des excréments sanguinolents dysentériques. J’ai eu l’impression que plusieurs d’entre eux étaient in extremis. [ACICR, BG-003-24-9]


In theory, Caserta was a temporary accommodation, and the PoWs were supposed to be transferred to other, smaller structures. In reality, they often remained there until they stopped being sick. Besides wounds, the PoWs suffered from several illnesses, often accompanied by dysentery, which afflicted almost half of the prisoners in Caserta.
The hospital had many issues (starting with many different types of patients), but three, in particular, made things difficult: first, the constant pilfering of the Red Cross Parcels, which deprived the prisoners of goods that were, for them, a first necessity (even more than for the other PoWs in the camps). Second the lack of supplies, including medicines and nursing equipment (a common issue in Italian PoW structures). Third, the obstructionist, if not openly hostile, behaviour of the personnel, including the medical staff. According to the sources, the Italian doctors did not appreciate the interventions of medical personnel among the Allied PoWs and tried to stop them. Moreover, the Italians were not always present in the hospital, depriving the PoWs of their assistance. This worsened the situation, even if the Protecting Power and Red Cross reports were not very critical of Caserta. As is often the case, there is a significant difference between the reports written by external observers and the PoWs’ testimonies, including those of the medical officers. Specifically, the Swiss delegates claim that the PoWs’ representatives were exaggerating the hospital’s shortcomings.
On the other hand, a medical officer testified that, for example, the guards were not trained to deal with mental illnesses. The PoWs affected by them were often considered rebellious, undisciplined, or would-be escapees. On 29 September 1942, Ghulam Kilani, a 21- year-old Pakistani affected by a mental illness (certified by both British and Italian doctors), was killed because of the guards’ incompetence. It seems Jilani ignored an order to stop and passed the sentries while leaving the medical ward. In response, the guards shot him in the back on the stairs. His fellow PoWs maintained he was going to the outhouse since, among other things, he suffered from dysentery.
According to the British, the camp’s Command was responsible for the poor situation in Caserta, in particular Col. Bertoni, a Fascist who was strongly hostile towards the PoWs. Although the report by the IRCC delegate who visited the hospital in November 1942 was generally positive, he noted how, despite Bertoni’s efforts (according to him), the relations between the Italian medical staff and the prisoners were poor. Often, for example, the Allied medical officers were not even consulted; moreover, they could not see the patients for a good portion of the day while the Italians were visiting them. Their visits had to be made under surveillance, and there were even many disagreements about how to treat patients. Naturally, the PoWs could not prescribe or administer medicines. This situation was compounded by the Italians often refusing to take advantage of interpreters, which led to erroneous diagnoses and therapies. Even when, despite all of this, there was some level of co-operation, the general inefficiency of the hospital prevented good treatment of the PoWs. As noted by a British doctor:

The Italian doctor with whom I was at the time was very upset. He came from Sicily, and I found him helpful, subject to the shortage of medical supplies and equipment. I do not remember the name of the Commandant of the Hospital, but I do remember he was not a doctor. As regards general conditions at Caserta, on the whole, these were not bad. The medical staff were quite pleasant, though I formed the opinion that their standard in medicine was not very high. The building was an old one and infested with fleas and bugs. There was always a shortage of dressings, drugs and equipment. My chief complaint was that the patients were not allowed out of the wards at all so that they never got any fresh air. [TNA, TS 26/707]


Oliver Ive, another British medical officer in Caserta, added that:

There was always a serious shortage of dressings and drugs; we had great difficulty in getting supplies of morphia, although there was a reasonable supply in the Hospital. It was kept locked up, and as the Italian Medical Officers mostly had practices outside and only attended the Hospital during part of their time, we could not get any morphia at night when it would be most needed. As a result, we used to try and secrete small amounts or morphia when we did get it issued to build up a store for emergency. [TNA, TS 26/781]


Lt. Col. M.R. Sinclair also noted that:

Surgical treatment was callous in extreme. Anaesthetics were very sparingly used, and the screams and shouts of the wounded undergoing daily painful dressings and operations were the commonest hospital sound throughout the day. […] Until very strong protests were made by me, amputations were carried out on the slightest provocation without any effort to save the limb. [TNA, TS 26/709]


Even urgent surgical procedures for the PoWs were systematically delayed if the operating rooms were needed for the Italians. The only staff who showed some sympathy for the patients were the Red Cross nurses, «specially recruited by the Princess of Piedmont for the main P.W. hospitals» [TNA, TS 26/709]. Princess Maria Josè herself often visited Caserta, bringing the Red Cross nurses with her. They, however, were usually removed by the Italian command, possibly because they were too friendly to the PoWs.
In October 1942 the only escape attempt from the hospital took place. Major Stuppell escaped and reached the Swiss border. He was recaptured at the very last moment and sent to PG 5 Gavi, a punishment camp, where he was put in solitary for 30 days. Another PoW held in Caserta, who perhaps helped Stuppell escape, was sent to PG 66 Capua with the “duty to sign” (meaning make his presence known to the guards) every five minutes.
In Caserta, some of the PoWs who had attempted to escape from PG 66 Capua died: Lt. Joseph Henry Reeves on 18 August 1942 and Rifleman Colin Davies in November of the same year.
After March 1943, Capua gradually lost importance, at least as far as PoWs were concerned. Many patients were transferred elsewhere. The hospital was then earmarked for Italian soldiers and civilians, but a few PoWs remained there until the Armistice.
After the war, the poor treatment of the PoWs was investigated. Col. Giuseppe D’Amborsio, chief of the hospital, was put on the war criminals’ list, as the British identified him as the man responsible for the appalling conditions of the PoWs and Jilani’s death. According to the UNWCC, he was accused as below:

1. Insufficient medical attention was given to Prisoners of War and particularly at the time when there were no British Medical Officers. Italian Medical Officers were not resident in the Camp.
2. There was no or little sufficient nursing service provided.
3. No provision was made for Prisoners to obtain the benefits of fresh air and exercise.
4. No proper diet was provided in cases where diet was essential to recovery.
5. The Italian personnel at the Camp were harsh and brutal and on at least one occasion assaulted a sick prisoner, placed him in detention and kept him handcuffed. […].
6. Letters and reports of the Prisoners were not forwarded, particularly those to the Protecting Power.
7. Prisoners were not treated with respect or protected, nor treated with humanity and properly cared for medically. [TNA, TS 26/781]


Col. Bertoni, too (D’Ambrosio’s second in command) was investigated, but both were released at the beginning of 1946, as they were deemed incompetent rather than war criminals.
In November 1943, the Allies occupied the hospital and used it to treat their men, while the Italian civilians were relocated to Maddaloni hospital. Some areas were given to the Allied Military Government, which used them until 1947.
In 1952, the building returned to being an Italian military hospital and was renamed “Caserma Gennaro Tescione” (an officer killed in Rhodes after the Armistice). In recent years, it has been partially demolished and reclassified.

Archival sources

Bibliography

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